workplaces, and this led to the semi-participatory welfare State as an effort to control and contain revolutionary activity. Then, as these 'mass workers' refused to limit their demands for wages or for participation in the State, the dominant class attempted to repeal welfare, replacing it with discipline by austerity: trade unions were attacked, factories become more robotic with less workers (or with workers controlled or under surveillance by computers), and middle class work was deskilled and its privileges eroded (Negri 1989, 89-101) . Capital became more mobile to escape workers' demands, and more money was invested in speculative activities: 'Beneath the rosy images of the information society lie the stark goals of "control and reduction in the costs of labour"' (Negri, quoted in Dyer-Witheford 2004) .
The whole of organised society, then, is geared towards the replication and reproduction of capital. This system is sometimes labelled the 'social factory' or the 'diffuse factory' (Negri 1989, 204) . Thus contestation with capitalism moves beyond the actual factory (Dyer-Witheford 2004; Cleaver 2000, 70) and the antagonism is polyvalent and multiple (Negri 1989, 87) . This leads to Hardt and Negri's replacement of the 'working class' with the category of 'Multitude.'
The dyad: Empire and multitude
Like a number of contemporary thinkers, Hardt and Negri propose that the world is being divided into two. The governing terms of their discussion are 'Empire' and 'Multitude.' The importance of Empire, which Hardt and Negri distinguish from imperialism, is that 'Empire establishes no territorial center of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers ' (2000, xii) . Elsewhere, Negri defines Empire as 'the transfer of sovereignty of nation-states to a higher entity,' but not to a World Nation, or to an existent nation like the United States (2004, 59) . While Empire contains the dynamics of capitalism, the concept is not restricted to capital alone, for it is intended to capture the diffuseness of contemporary power.
Negri and Hardt's use of the term 'Empire' is unfortunate as it may imply a single center of power, and many critics attempt to refute Hardt and Negri's idea by arguing that the current U.S. government is attempting to establish a conventional Empire or is acting as if it already had one. However, it is not clear that this U.S. empire will be attained; it depends on the cooperation of other states, and some claim that the Bush Administration's attempts to extend and enforce U.S. control will destroy U.S.
dominance (Johnson 2004; Soros 2003) . The corporate world seems split on the war in Iraq rather than uniformly behind the U.S.A. The Iraq war favours some corporations (Haliburton, MCI, Bechtel) over others (Microsoft, Coca Cola) who fear destruction of their markets in the Middle East. Furthermore, while the U.S.A. is very powerful, other states also have power, as do NGOs, and the movements of capital and chaos in markets are other sources of influence outside the control of any state.
To some extent, power has always been distributed. Political scientists discuss the 'balance of power,' which implies there is never a sole power and that power arises in 'ratios,' to use Norbert Elias's term. Elias claims that power ratios 'are bi-polar at least, and usually multi-polar ' (1978, 74-5, 131) . Even dictators and absolute monarchs are not completely free to act, being constrained by the activities of others (Elias 1983, 277ff.) . Power ratios are an expression of the dynamic patterning of human coaction. Those patterns, which are easily activated, express the established modes of power. Once power is looked at in this way, rather than in terms of a thing that someone possesses and other people do not, then it can be recognised that there is always contestation. What is different in the contemporary world is that many of these power ratios operate over almost the whole planet simultaneously, rather than being confined to particular areas.
Because the term 'Empire' lacks clarity, I will use the term 'distributed governance' to refer to power being diffused through a system, displaying distributed responsibility, and of appearing in places with no apparent origin. In Negri and
Hardt's analysis'Multitude' is a term with several meanings. Firstly it refers to an irreducible multiplicity of subjects (Negri 2004, 111) . As such it is opposed to the supposed unitary conception of 'the people' that has been the conceptual basis of Western sovereignty (Hardt and Negri 2004, 79, 99) . Second, Multitude is the 'class of productive singularities, the class of the operators of immaterial labour' (Negri 2004, 112) . This is an unfortunate definition as it presumably excludes unproductive singularities or people who engage in 'material labour'-leaving out much of the world, which earlier Autonomist theory did not. The Multitude is all those who labour PORTAL vol. 3, no. 1 January 2006and produce under capital, and Hardt and Negri assert that the differences dividing labour no longer exist (2004, 107) . As they put it, 'The creation of the Multitude, its innovation in networks, and its decision-making ability in common makes democracy possible for the first time today' Problems of difference and separation are essentially dismissed. Finally, the Multitude appears to have the singular desire 'to recreate this world in its image and likeness. ' (2004, 340) . So, Empire creates Multitude and Multitude creates the Empire of distributed power, in mutuality.
Hardt and Negri claim that, 'the creative forces of the Multitude that sustain Empire are also capable of autonomously constructing a counter-Empire, an alternative political organization of global flows and exchanges ' (2000, xv) . It appears that the term 'Multitude,' through its connotations of multiplicity, entails the fall of the implied singularity of Empire when itself it makes up part of the distributed dynamics.
If taken seriously as intertwined, then no overthrow or freedom need arise from mutual participation, any more than the Hegelian dependence of masters on slaves means that slaves can easily rebel.
Rather than agreeing with Hardt and Negri's techno-optimism, I argue that Empire and Multitude are not separable into power and democracy. In the Autonomist sense, although capitalist social formations may arise as defence from the actions of the Multitude, this does not mean that liberation is automatic, although a new stage of struggle may arise. Power being distributed or networked does not automatically mean democracy. The more powerful the node the more alliances it may be able to make, the more entrenched pathways of action it can activate. Networks can extend central power out into the world as much as weaken it. Networks interact and thus 'communicate,' but there is no need for these communications to be meaningful, and they may not enable us to find commonality as Hardt and Negri suggest (2004, xiii, xv) . Groups can interact and polarise or separate. They can increase mutual hatred as much as 'community'. Communication and connection is not an unrelieved good always bringing harmony or unity. Popular resistance can also be oppressive of others, as happens with the Christian Right's resistance to secularism and the nonrighteous, or in neo-fascism's resistance to race mixing. Resistance can become institutionalised, in 'rituals of rebellion' and allow people to let off steam and engage in minor rebellions, which do not affect the overall patterns of power (Gluckman 1956 (Gluckman , 1963 ' (2000, 385) . That is, 'The development of communication networks has an organic relationship to the emergence of the new world order -it is, in other words, effect and cause, product and producer.
1 Castells similarly distinguishes between those who inhabit the global 'space of flows' and those who inhabit the local 'space of place.' Or, as he puts it, 'elites are cosmopolitan, people are local ' (1996, 415) . There may no longer be a capitalist class but a network, 'a faceless collective capitalist, made up of financial flows operated by electronic networks' (474). Thus, 'At its core, capital is global. As a rule, labour is local' (475).
Communication not only expresses but organises the movement of globalisation (32).
Hardt and Negri also point out that information technology ensures that '[c]ommunication and control can be exercised efficiently at a distance,' but rather than conclude that this could extend centralised control directly to the periphery, they only accept the idea of distributed control, suggesting that the internet makes a good model for Multitude (Hardt and Negri 2004, xv) . They further imply that informational networks free liberation movements of the necessity of becoming organised in hierarchies, or of having to impose order after the chaos of revolution and thus assert that revolutionary freedom will finally be possible (68-78). and 'Big Unions' are thus frequently represented by right wing proponents as outmoded relics in the information economy. Similarly, Bill Gates claims that the availability of information and networking equality will make capitalism frictionless and finally able to work (1995, Chapter 8) . This is not to suggest that Hardt, Negri or Toffler are right wing theorists or dupes, but that perhaps we are dealing with widespread utopian longings rather than radical analysis-especially given the bypassing of Negri's early writings and the Autonomist awareness of the struggles around technology.
Central to these standard arguments has been the rise to power of the 'knowledge worker,' or in this case, the immaterial worker, or worker with immaterials (ideas, symbols, images, art, and so on). Referring to service work, Hardt and Negri write that 'Since the production of services results in no material and durable good, we define the labor involved in this production as immaterial labor-that is, labor that produces an immaterial good, such as a service, a cultural product, knowledge, or communication ' (2000, 290) . They explicitly tie this to computers transforming 'laboring practices in such a way that they all tend toward the model of information and communication technologies ' (2000, 291) . Negri (2004) argues that the transition 'from material to immaterial production' means that the main instrument of production is the worker's brain (a formulation that deletes the rest of the body). This is supposed to mean that the owners of capital no longer own the means of production and can no longer confiscate the fruits of production (Negri 2004, 91) . In fact, workfor-hire provisions are part of all modern copyright law, and it is more real to claim that capitalists now own, for only as long as they want, the 'brains' of the workers.
Standard contracts forbid people from working on projects that are similar to projects they have previously worked on, so employee's capacity to build up and use valuable knowledge is restricted. Furthermore, contemporary knowledge management systems seek to replace the specialised knowledge of particular workers with programs-a classic example of the Autonomist theory of capitalist development.
Hardt and Negri imply that knowledge workers will cooperate democratically as
Multitude to oppose capital. In contrast Toffler argues that whereas industrial production required standardisation and uniformity in the workplace, allowing the workforce to find a common cause out of a common experience, information work requires change, innovation and individually oriented production; therefore, the workforce has no sense of commonality and finds it hard to organise (1984, 38) .
Knowledge workers tend to unite only on certain issues rather than around groups of issues. People mix ideas from both 'Left' and 'Right' and can splinter on fundamental points. Lack of permanence in a workplace and constant competition between work groups also fracture bonds between people. Another early theorist of the information society, Daniel Bell, proposed that knowledge workers are divided into 'four estates, the scientific, the technological, the administrative and the cultural' with large operational disjunctions between them (1976, . Again, this suggests that the Multitude is not necessarily brought together. As Autonomist theory argues, the Multitude can be both divided and rendered replaceable by capitalist innovation.
Hardt and Negri go on to suggest that this information economy challenges traditional ideas of property, as:
[p]roducing increasingly means constructing cooperation and communicative commonalities … in the context of linguistic and cooperative production, labor and the PORTAL vol. 3, no. 1 January 2006common property tend to overlap. Private property, despite its juridical powers, cannot help becoming an ever more abstract and transcendental concept and thus ever more detached from reality. A new notion of 'commons' will have to emerge on this terrain. (2000, 302) The information economy's central paradox is that it encourages and requires quick and easy distribution of information, but capitalists need to restrict access in order to charge consumers and generate profit. The internet may thus seem radical as it allows data-products to be copied and distributed easily, causing panic to manufacturers who claim ownership of such products and who make their money selling them.
Although the ways property is viewed may be changing, the ways property is implemented or appropriated may not change as a result of new views-any more than the idea that property is theft, or the idea that property is alienated from the worker, had long term effects on the ways property operates. Society can encompass several different ways of defining property. It could be argued that rather than property exploding under new ideas of digital commons, corporate property is being successfully extended into fields in which it would previously have been legally unjustified, such as patenting genes or other 'natural' products. James Boyle (1996) claims that the notion of the corporate author does for information what economic notions of natural markets did for the industrial revolution, by providing a method of appropriating what is really an intertwined production, or a naturally occurring phenomenon.
If information equals property, then information cannot be free as in the old Hacker slogan. Workers have to create, but what they make is rarely their own. Instead it seems as if workers are appendages to some kind of program, which uses them only for as long as they are not replaceable. In similar fashion 'ordinary people' do not own information about themselves and, due to the risk of leaks, many information workers are under surveillance and control. There is a tendency for intelligence agencies and the corporate sector to work together to beat national competitors. This in turn leads to increased counter and pre-emptive surveillance. Toffler warned that 'If intelligence operations … become so intertwined with the everyday activities of society, so decentralised, so fused with business and other private interests, as to make effective control impossible, democracy will be in mortal peril ' (1990, 318) . The new economy has intensified patterns of capitalist dominance-the corporate sector has more relative power than it used to. Work has become total and inequalities of income have increased. Internationalisation is used as an excuse to increase the salaries of high level executives and decrease the wages of workers. The tax burden has shifted from the corporate sector onto the Multitude (Johnston 2003; Wolff 2004) . The rollback of the state has mainly occurred in those areas in which it helped people, or in which it acted as a check on corporate action.
Distributed governance
As stated previously, Hardt and Negri imply that the network of distributed power ultimately generates democracy. Unfortunately there is little evidence that this is necessarily so. This section considers some cases in which distribution has not reinforced democracy or democratic accountability. (2004, 59 ). Again it is unlikely this response will undermine hierarchy, although it may diffuse responsibility. Commanders now appear to have little responsibility for the behaviour of those under their command who supposedly 'act at their own initiative,' as at Abu Ghraib where prisoners were abused in full view of troops who wandered casually around them. Yet it was not, we were told, the responsibility of the army, or of the commander of the gaols, or of the intelligence operatives who implied this might be the best procedure, but rather of a few people who happened to be photographed. The network diffuses connections of power. Even if the command encourages something, or tacitly approves it, they have no responsibility for the results. This vagueness may well help the centre maintain control in ways it could not do otherwise. This is in line with Negri's statement that since 'The world elite decides, but it never considers itself responsible,' its decisions are blamed on, or simply portrayed as accommodation to the universal, and politically neutral, realities of the market; as with decisions about supplying AIDS drugs to Africa (2004, 92) . Responsibility is distributed while the impact of power focused.
Power is seemingly emptied out of place so that power can become total, as in A business parallel is the James Hardie case, whereby an Australian company knowingly poisoned its workers with asbestos for profit. The corporation walled off its responsibility in order to let the profits be unmolested by its victims. Eventually the company's responsibility was defined by the courts, but a year later no compensation had yet been paid. And although the director was sacked for this, he received far more money than any of the victims would.
In daily life we may note that businesses 'fall over' if their network fails, and we are often told 'the computers are down' and nothing can be done, or that the computer does not allow a certain type of response. Telephone service centres seem designed to cause people to hang up after long periods of waiting, and the workers generally have little knowledge beyond that provided by the computer. Fault and responsibility is distributed elsewhere. This distributed responsibility does not increase representation, rebellion or resistance, but confusion and frustration.
The political Left also distributes responsibility. The Left in Australia was voted out of high office; it no longer has any party with appeal (both the main parties in Actions such as those used by the religious Right, however, are not the spontaneous organisation of Negri's Multitudes. In fact distributed power causes a problem for revolutionaries as the adversary seems to have disappeared (Negri 2004, 92) . All
Negri can council is withdrawal, although this may not be possible for everyone (2004, 93) . Resistance can be discovered at a private level; there are possibilities beyond oneself (94). Faced with the vagueness of distributed governance, we retreat away from others. This too is based on an Autonomist tradition (Tronti 1965) whereby the workers were to withdraw co-operation, or to engage in strikes and sabotage. However, in a system in which everyone is intertwined, to where do people withdraw? Negri's suggestion is that people withdraw to the internet, especially the areas apparently outside corporate control.
The internet and radicalism
At the beginning of Empire, despite their reliance on information society-type theorising, Hardt and Negri are sceptical about the internet. They write about various intense struggles over the world:
First, each struggle, though firmly rooted in local conditions, leaps immediately to the global level and attacks the imperial constitution in its generality. Second, all the struggles destroy the traditional distinction between economic and political struggles.
The struggles are at once economic, political, and cultural-and hence they are biopolitical struggles, struggles over the form of life. They are constituent struggles, creating new public spaces and new forms of community …. [However,] the struggles do not communicate despite their being hypermediatized, on television, the Internet, and every other imaginable medium. Once again we are confronted by the paradox of incommunicability. In political terms, the global information infrastructure might be characterized as the combination of a democratic mechanism and an oligopolistic mechanism, which operate along different models of network systems. The democratic network is a completely horizontal and deterritorialized model. The Internet, which began as a project of DARPA (the U.S. Defense Department Advanced Research Projects Agency), but has now expanded to points throughout the world, is the prime example of this democratic network structure .... This democratic model is what Deleuze and Guattari call a rhizome, a nonhierarchical and noncentered network structure. (2000, In his informal conversations Negri also points to the internet as a source of collaborative freedom: 'levels of cooperation and sharing exist everywhere, even writing an article on a computer means having to rely on a common knowledge, which is to say the Internet ' (2004, 27 The history of the internet is more complex than portrayed by Negri and Hardt.
Although the internet was largely built by programmers using exchange of information in a way resembling open source groups, it has to be recognised that the internet grew within the framework of military, academic, corporate, and 
Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and
Communication Services and Facilities, which began in 1966, was told that the number of non-defence computer systems had risen from 91 in 1953 to more than 35,000 in 1966, and that more than 2,000 online systems were in use with more than 45,000 data terminals (Schiller 1982, 22) . Representatives from the petroleum, aerospace, computer, banking, insurance, transport and retail sectors all testified before the inquiry into the importance of data transmission and computer networks in their forward planning. They all uniformly complained that the transmission services offered by AT&T hindered this computerisation (23-34). Commercial networks were widespread and militant before the ARPANet was even begun.
Similarly, in 1980, the International Communications Association submitted to the FCC that 'international telecommunications provides the pipeline which enables U.S.
industry to extend its enterprise to the vast world markets' (Schiller 1982, 99 Although it is tempting to think of hackers in terms of Deleuze and Guattari's nomadology, the Critical Art Ensemble points out that it is actually the elite who uses cyberspace to make a diffuse power field without location, and a fixed sight machine appearing as spectacle ... hostility from the oppressed is rechannelled into the bureaucracy which misdirects antagonism away from the nomadic power field. (Raymond 1998 (Raymond , 1999 . agenda, but when asked, FOSS developers invariably offer a firm and unambiguous "no" -usually followed by a precise lexicon for discussing the proper relationship between FOSS and politics ' (2004, 507) . Coleman goes on to suggest that this apolitical stance is one way in which the movement tries to work politically:
[It] facilitates the broad mobility of FOSS as artefacts and metaphors and thus lays the groundwork for its informal political scope, its key role as a catalyst by which to rethink the assumptions of intellectual property rights through its use and inversion (2004, 508)…. [However, some of the appeal of apolticism may be because] it has afforded a wider cultural and political language by which to objectify to themselves and larger publics the nature of their technical life world, an objectification buttressed within a hacker public sphere and as a political vector to make claims against the aggressive application of intellectual property restrictions, primarily in the defence of other programmers. (2004, 511) The ideal of open source groups is technical meritocracy, that is, an elite to some extent separated from political and social issues, using its position to criticise those not of the elite. As Coleman puts it:
politics tend to be seen by programmers as buggy, mediated, and tainted action clouded by ideology that is not productive of much of anything while it insidiously works against true forms of free thought. You can't tweak politics in an elegant and creative way to achieve something immediately gratifying, and thus it goes against everything programmers think and love about computing (2004, 513 Far from presuming free software's steady advancement, the proponents of Peru's free software legislation undertook various forms of local and non-local work, advocacy, and activism to propel the visibility of their movement. Further, their practices departed from the language of technical and economic rationality that had been repeatedly invoked to explain free software's adoption. They insisted instead on a new framing of free software as necessarily engaged and invested in processes of governance and political reform…. Peru's free software advocates actively sought to build relations with bodies of governance, demonstrating a willingness to engage with traditional political channels. (2004, 532) In other words, this was not the Multitude abandoning the State and paths already established for something else. It is true they established contacts throughout the world, and especially in South America to engage in their activism, but it was not a product of electronic networks alone-they were an adjunct.
Prominent U.S.-based FOSS people were not supportive of the political action in Peru, as Chan notes:
Tony Stanco, a senior policy analyst at The George Washington University's Cyberspace Policy Institute… [warned] against the imposition of politics over rational markets. Writing in Linux Today, Stanco asserted, 'It is much better for governments to set up a real level playing field in procurement policy and then let the market decide on merit. If a product can't make it in the market without government mandates, then history has shown that it won't make it with government mandates either.' … Stanco was echoed by other free software supporters, who, in a Brookings Institute publication aimed at government policy makers themselves … collectively urged governments to maintain a stance of neutrality in software acquisition policy. Some insisted that free software would advance without the need for government involvement … while others argued that free software preferences would compromise consumer freedom of choice. (2004, 534) Even Richard Stallman, who is usually considered to be the 'raving communist' of the free software movement, reacted by asserting that 'energies would be better spent preventing governments' over-regulation and infringement on user freedoms, than on fostering ties to legislative bodies ' (Chan 2004, 543 has not been detailed, it appears that these groups are male focused and not open to gender differences. Given the history of hacking (programming), as it has been described by Turkle (1984) and Levy (1994) I also used to believe that sexism was dead. Shortly after joining several women in computing mailing lists, I realized how wrong I was. Week after week, women have new stories about how they were discriminated against and insulted because they were women. These stories aren't decades old, nor do they involve people who grew up when sexism was more acceptable. These are day-to-day experiences of today's women, in modern settings, who are being driven out of their chosen profession by sexism.
Henson tells of how women who attend offline meetings may be pointed at, or greeted with silence, as they enter the room. And Yuwei Lin writes:
I have observed that when Allison [Randal, president of the Perl Foundation] spoke at the Italian Code Jam 2004 activity, she acted, and also was treated, rather as an assistant for Larry Wall than being an outstanding programmer whom would be granted as much respect as her male peers. (2005, 4) A survey of the FOSS movement states 'The FLOSS survey on OS/FS developers confirms the findings of the WIDI project that women do not play a role in the development of open source and free software; only 1.1% of the FLOSS sample is female' (Ghosh et al, Part 4, 8) . It might be mentioned that this is the only sentence in the report with the word 'gender' in it. The gender equalities that Hardt and Negri report from Latin American resistance movements, and which they advance as the way of the Multitude, are not present in FOSS movements.
Structurally the FOSS groups tend not to be so equitable amongst men either. Lerner and Tirole remark that 'the top decile of contributors accounted for fully 72% of the code,' and this was accepted by the group (2002, 204) . They also note that 'Important contributors are few and ascend to the "core group" status, the ultimate recognition by one's peers' (205). These groups also have leaders who have been described, to me, as 'benevolent dictators.' Bosco remarks:
It should be noted that there is a central figure called 'project leader' or 'maintainer' who is in charge for accepting, reviewing and integrating new features or fixes into the main source code. Once the project leader has reviewed and accepted the contribution, it is eventually integrated and delivered to the large public of users in the next software version. (2004, 12) Lerner and Tirole suggest that a leader must convince 'contributors … that their leader's objectives are sufficiently congruent with theirs and not polluted by egodriven, commercial or political biases ' (2002, 222) . The initial leader seems usually to be the person who can present enough source code to suggest that the project is viable to enough people who might want to help. Bosco continues:
In addition, a project leader provides a coordination service to the participants of the project; he makes sure that contributors working on the development of the same functionality are in contact with each other and hopefully collaborate; he makes sure that the development goes smoothly and tries to ease up tensions between disagreeing developers. (2004, 19) Occasionally, as with the Apache Server, the software may be controlled by a small group of people who vote on particular changes and developments (Bosco 2004, 20 FOSS movements are not an unproblematic model for democratic, non-hierarchical revolutionary, action. People in the movements tend to self constitute as a hierarchical technical elite (which is not necessarily a bad thing), and they tend to view politics as something they should not be involved in, perhaps as a way of generating unity amongst themselves. They favour quietist and technical solutions, and when technical solutions within their framework are not immediately obvious, they tend to lose interest. They are also inclined to ignore people who are not of the same group, and to ignore issues of promulgation.
What can activists learn from all this? Firstly, it is probably advisable not be seduced by technology in itself. As the early Autonomists emphasised, technology may result from a reaction to a perceived lack of control by dominant groups. Any beneficial freeing effects taken up by the Multitude may produce more attempts at control. Thus struggle is dynamic within the technology. Technology enables and restricts. It is not entirely positive or negative; the effects have to be created.
It is possible to learn from those who have succeeded, such as the FOSS supporters in Peru who continued 'normal' political action within the state. The success of Rightwing Christians in mobilising cannot be ignored-Left-wing Christians have not been as successful. This is remarkable, as the differences splitting these organisations are at least as great as differences within the Left, and their potential differences with the corporatist Right could be explosive. As I have implied earlier the religious Right does not let responsibility lie elsewhere; it takes action. The religious Right also takes action within the official power structures of the state, rather than hoping that new structures will arise. In that sense the religious Right claims the power structures of the state for itself.
Taking responsibility, rather than allowing that responsibility to be distributed, and acting within a particular place, rather than only within vague online spaces, is important. The idea of distributed governance suggests that those in power are not always in control; they are also confused, and governance can escape them. The network is complicated. Thus they may well tend to be either over-reactive or helpless in the face of a prolonged active and vocal opposition that assumes it can actually do something about the situation in question. Finally, from the hackers themselves we can learn from Cox's idea that everyone who is interested can do something, but not everyone has to do everything. Some people make the tea, or write the manuals, and these actions are important.
The internet can provide a medium for action, but it is not in itself radical or a model for that action, and neither are all the groups that have used the internet as their basis for communication. 
